Your Best Self Helps Reveal Your True Self: Positive Self-Presentation Leads to More Accurate Personality Impressions

Lauren J. Human, Jeremy C. Biesanz, Kate L. Parisotto and Elizabeth W. Dunn

Social Psychological and Personality Science 2012 3: 23 originally published online 9 May 2011
DOI: 10.1177/1948550611407689

The online version of this article can be found at:
http://spp.sagepub.com/content/3/1/23
Your Best Self Helps Reveal Your True Self: Positive Self-Presentation Leads to More Accurate Personality Impressions

Lauren J. Human1, Jeremy C. Biesanz1, Kate L. Parisotto1, and Elizabeth W. Dunn1

Abstract
How does trying to make a positive impression on others impact the accuracy of impressions? In an experimental study, the impact of positive self-presentation on the accuracy of impressions was examined by randomly assigning targets to either “put their best face forward” or to a control condition with low self-presentation demands. First, self-presenters successfully elicited more positive impressions from others, being viewed as more normative and better liked than those less motivated to self-present. Importantly, self-presenters were also viewed with greater accuracy than control targets, being perceived more in line with their self-reported distinctive personality traits and their IQ test scores. Mediational analyses were consistent with the hypothesis that self-presenters were more engaging than controls, which in turn led these individuals to be viewed with greater distinctive self–other agreement. In sum, positive self-presentation facilitates more accurate impressions, indicating that putting one’s best self forward helps reveal one’s true self.

Keywords
accuracy, self–other agreement, self-presentation, person perception, first impressions

Man is least himself when he talks in his own person. Give him a mask, and he will tell you the truth.
–Oscar Wilde

Individuals attempt to make positive impressions on others in a range of social situations, from job interviews to first dates. Interestingly, the very situations where individuals try the hardest to impress are those where accurate impressions are most critical to the perceiver. Although traditionally and intuitively, self-presentation has “evoked images of superficiality rather than substance, and deception rather than authenticity” (Schlenker & Pontari, 2000, p. 199), day-to-day positive self-presentation may not hinder the accuracy of first impressions of personality but may actually enhance it.

Self-presentation is the goal-directed process of controlling information about the self to influence others’ impressions (Baumeister, 1982; Goffman, 1959; Schlenker, 1980). In positive self-presentation, the aim is to make a good impression on others, through emphasizing one’s positive traits and minimizing one’s negative traits. In the current study, we are particularly interested in positive self-presentation without deception, which is likely typical of most day-to-day self-presentation attempts. In fact, self-presentation is often described as involving the dual goals of making a good impression while remaining authentic (Leary, 1995; Schlenker & Pontari, 2000). This is likely due to the potential negative interpersonal consequences of one’s deception being discovered—for instance, people respond negatively to those whose actions differ from their words (Schlenker & Leary, 1982). Further, deceiving others may have negative personal consequences to one’s sense of authenticity, which seems to be a primary motive for many people (Swann, Pelham, & Krull, 1989). Indeed, even in online social networks and web pages, where people are undoubtedly self-presenting, they provide others with valid cues to their personalities and allow them to form accurate impressions (Back et al., 2010; Vazire & Gosling, 2004). At the same time, self-presentation attempts in first impressions are also often successful in that people are able to elicit the desired impression from others (e.g., Murphy, 2007; Paulhus, 1998), indicating that accuracy and positive bias may coexist when self-presentation occurs. This is possible

1 Department of Psychology, University of British Columbia, Vancouver, BC, Canada

Corresponding Author:
Lauren J. Human, Department of Psychology, University of British Columbia, 2136 West Mall, Vancouver, BC, Canada V6T 1Z4
Email: lhuman@psych.ubc.ca
given that accuracy and positive bias can be independent in personality impressions (e.g., Fletcher & Kerr, 2010; Funder & Colvin, 1997).

However, not only is accuracy possible in the face of self-presentation, we argue it is actually enhanced. Why would self-presentation enhance accuracy in personality impressions? According to Funder’s (1999) Realistic Accuracy Model (RAM), there are four critical components to accurate impressions: The target must make relevant cues available to others, while the perceiver must detect and appropriately utilize these cues. Given that we are investigating positive self-presentation without deception, targets should still provide relevant, diagnostic cues to perceivers when self-presenting, enabling others to form accurate impressions in the face of self-presentation. However, we argue that self-presentation may actually enhance accuracy through its impact on nonverbal behavior (DePaulo, 1992) and its corresponding impact on perceivers’ attention. Specifically, positive self-presentation is likely to result in more cheerful, engaging behaviors (e.g., Rosenfeld, 1966). In turn, perceivers are likely to pay more attention to such pleasant individuals, just as they do with more attractive individuals (Lorenzo, Biesanz, & Human, 2010). This enhanced motivation and attention should facilitate the cue detection and utilization phases of RAM, thereby enhancing accuracy. Indeed, greater motivation and information lead to more accurate impressions (e.g., Biesanz & Human, 2010; Biesanz, West, & Millevoy, 2007; Letzring, Wells, & Funder, 2006). Thus, we predict that although self-presenters may not provide different verbal information than those less motivated to self-present, they will behave in such a way so as to capture more attention from others, and, as a result, be seen with more distinctive accuracy.

There is preliminary empirical support that self-presentational goals can enhance the accuracy of impression formation. First, when motivated to advance their own agenda during an interaction, targets, on average, are able to mitigate perceivers’ experimentally induced negative bias (Smith, Neuberg, Judice, & Biesanz, 1997). Thus, assuming self-presenters are motivated to present both a positive and an authentic picture to others, they may convey an even more authentic picture of themselves to others than those who are less explicitly motivated to do so. Second, there is evidence that trait self-presenters, indexed by those who score highly on the acting component of the Self-Monitoring Scale (Snyder, 1987), agree more with close others about their characteristics than those who score low on this scale (Cheek, 1982), suggesting that self-presenters may be viewed more accurately by those who know them well. Finally, and most directly, the specific self-presentational goal of appearing smart does lead to more accurate impressions of an individual’s intelligence (Murphy, 2007). However, whether more general positive self-presentation leads to more accurate broad personality impressions and the causal mechanisms behind this process remain to be determined.

We will be examining two independent components of accuracy in the current study: distinctive and normative accuracy (Biesanz, 2010; Furr, 2008), which are analogous to Cronbach’s (1955) components of differential and stereotype accuracy, respectively (for further details, see Biesanz, 2010). Distinctive accuracy refers to understanding others’ unique profiles of personality traits, relative to the average person. Importantly, being able to differentiate people from the average person implies an ability to differentiate people from other specific people. As such, distinctive accuracy can be interpreted both idiofactically and nomothetically: It reflects both the extent to which perceivers accurately discern the relative ordering traits within people, for example, whether someone is more reliable than sociable, and the extent to which perceivers accurately discern differences between people on traits, for example, who is more reliable than others (see Biesanz & Human, 2010, supplemental appendix; Kenny & Winquist, 2001, pp. 275-278).

In the current study, we predominantly index distinctive accuracy by examining distinctive self–other agreement across the Big Five personality traits, using self-reported personality traits as the accuracy benchmark for perceivers’ impressions. Although the self may not always be the ideal accuracy criterion (e.g., Vazire, 2010), self–other agreement is a common index of accuracy (e.g., Funder & Colvin, 1997), and is quite appropriate when the “other” is someone who has had minimal access to information about the target person, as in the current study. Nonetheless, because the trait of intelligence can be measured more objectively than most other traits, we use standardized intelligence test scores in addition to self-reports as accuracy criteria for the trait of intelligence. Overall, we use the terms distinctive accuracy and distinctive self–other agreement interchangeably, bearing in mind that the accuracy criterion is generally the target’s self-reported personality traits, with the exception of intelligence, for which we also have the standardized test scores.

Normative accuracy is the extent to which perceivers view others as possessing a similar profile of traits as the average person. Because the average person possesses a more positive than negative personality profile (Bornkau & Zaltauskas, 2009; Edwards, 1957), being perceived normatively implies being seen more positively. Given that the current study involves an experimental manipulation, we can utilize normative accuracy as an index of positive bias: People randomly assigned to self-present should not differ in their actual level of similarity to the average person compared to those in the control condition, so if perceivers see them more normatively, then they are being viewed with positive bias. Nonetheless, normative accuracy is a distinct concept from positivity, and therefore we also index the positivity of impressions by examining whether self-presenters were viewed as more attractive and better liked than those less motivated to self-present. In sum, we hypothesize that self-presenters will be seen more positively but also more accurately.

Positivity and distinctive accuracy can be independent because positivity is reflected in the mean levels of personality ratings while distinctive accuracy is reflected in the pattern of ratings. For instance, a perceiver could rate an individual as more sociable and reliable than he or she really is (reflecting...
a positive impression), but still accurately determine that the individual is more sociable than reliable (reflecting a distinctively accurate impression). Equivalently, two self-presenters could be seen as more sociable and reliable than they really are, but also more accurately compared in terms of who is more reliable than the other. Thus, greater distinctive accuracy would enable perceivers to better differentiate among self-presenters, understanding who might be better suited to a job where reliability is critical, for instance.

In sum, we hypothesize that positive self-presentation will enhance both the positivity and the accuracy of first impressions. In the following experiment, we examined whether perceivers’ impressions of those who had been explicitly instructed to self-present were more positive and accurate than impressions of those in a self-presentation-minimizing control group. We then examined the mechanisms behind these effects by examining whether self-presenters were more attention-getting and engaging than controls, and whether such engagement was in turn associated with greater distinctive self–other agreement. Overall, putting one’s best self forward is argued to capture others’ attention, thereby allowing others to more accurately see one’s true self.

**Study**

**Method**

**Participants.** A total of 66 University of British Columbia (UBC) undergraduates (51 females, 15 males; mean age = 21.89, SD = 5.73) participated in exchange for extra course credits. All participants viewed videotapes of 24 individuals (targets) and then rated their personalities on an abbreviated 21-item version of the Big Five Inventory (BFI; John & Srivastava, 1999) plus 3 items assessing intelligence: “Is intelligent,” “Is bright,” and “Receives good grades.” Participants also rated whether they thought the target was physically attractive and whether they liked each target on 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree) scales. Roughly half of the targets were instructed to self-present and half were given self-presentation minimizing instructions.

**Targets.** Target stimulus materials consisted of 24 UBC undergraduates who participated in a study ostensibly investigating the effects of “digital communication” in exchange for extra course credits. Of the 24 targets, 11 targets (7 female, 4 males; mean age = 21.6, SD = 4.25) had been instructed to self-present, while 13 (8 female, 5 male; mean age = 20.14, SD = 2.03) were given self-presentation minimizing instructions. All targets first completed self-report personality ratings on the BFI (John & Srivastava, 1999) plus the three intelligence items described above and completed the Wonderlic Personnel Test (WPT), a 50-item, 12-minute timed test of intelligence (test–retest reliability ranges from .82 to .94; Wonderlic, Inc., 2002). Next, targets were randomly assigned to either the control or self-presentation condition. All targets were told that they were in the “digital” condition and would be left alone in the lab to answer several getting-acquainted questions (e.g., “describe two or three interests”) provided on cue cards to the webcam.

The instructions in the self-presentation condition were adapted from previous research and have been shown to produce heightened self-presentation (Dunn, Biesanz, Human, & Finn, 2007). The instructions in the control condition were meant to minimize self-presentation attempts. Directly after answering all questions, targets rated their mood and completed multiple measures of general adjustment (see online supplementary appendix found at http://spp.sagepub.com/supplemental). Importantly, the control and self-presenting targets did not differ significantly from one another in terms of personality, IQ, adjustment, mood, or length of video clip, all |r| < 1.02.

Two trained research assistants also coded the videos and transcripts for information quantity, indexed by the number of words spoken, the number of topics mentioned, the number of sentences, speech rate, the amount of time looking at the camera, the amount of time looking at the camera while speaking, and the number of pauses (intraterer reliability intraclass correlations [ICCs] ranged from .83 to 1.00). Overall, self-presenters and controls did not differ on these indices of information quantity, indicating that targets in both conditions provided an equivalent amount of information.

**Coders.** A total of 99 coders (86 female, 13 male) were later recruited to rate our proposed mediator of how engaging and attention-getting the targets were in exchange for extra course credit. These coders watched each video clip and then rated the extent to which each target “managed to hold my attention throughout most of the video clip” on a 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree) scale. These coders also rated the quality of the information targets provided and a separate group of coders rated the targets’ behaviors, described in detail in the online supplementary appendix.

**Analytical approach.** To examine whether target self-presentation enhanced distinctive and normative accuracy, we estimated a multilevel model utilizing R’s lme4 package (Bates & Sarkar, 2007; R Development Core Team, 2009) following the social accuracy modeling procedures outlined by Biesanz (2010; for empirical examples, see Biesanz & Human, 2010;
Results

Accuracy of impressions. On average across condition, perceivers viewed targets with significant levels of distinctive self–other agreement, $b = .12, z = 3.48, p = .0005$. Importantly, as predicted, self-presenters were viewed with significantly greater distinctive self–other agreement than controls, change in $b = .14, d = .71$, interaction $z = 2.22, p = .026$ (see Figure 1). Note that this greater distinctive self–other agreement indicates that self-presenters’ individual profiles of traits (e.g., whether they reported being more sociable than reliable) and that differences across self-presenters’ traits (e.g., who reported being more sociable than others) were both more accurately perceived relative to those in the control condition.

We were also able to examine distinctive accuracy in impressions of a more objectively measured characteristic, intelligence, utilizing targets’ WPT IQ test scores ($M = 29.33, SD = 5.08$) as predictors of perceivers’ ratings on the three intelligence items (averaged to form a single composite intelligence rating). On average, perceivers viewed targets’ IQ levels accurately, $b = .03, z = 7.33, p < .001$. Furthermore, in line with our hypothesis and with the self–other agreement results, perceivers were significantly more accurate in detecting self-presenters’ than controls’ IQ scores, change in $b = .12$, interaction $z = 2.17, p = .009$. Thus, perceivers more accurately detected self-presenting targets’ self-reported personality traits as well as their more objectively measured intelligence levels.

Positivity of impressions. On average across conditions, targets were viewed with significant normative accuracy, $b = .52, z = 8.70, p < .0001$. Importantly, as predicted, self-presenting targets were seen as significantly more normative than control targets, change in $b = .20, d = .91$, interaction $z = 2.62, p = .009$. Thus, attempting to make a good impression on others did successfully lead to more positive personality impressions and greater liking.

Engagement/attention. As predicted, self-presenters were rated as more engaging ($M = 4.95, SD = .56$) than controls ($M = 4.22, SD = .41$), $d = .91, CI_{.95} = [0.03, 1.77]$, $t(21) = 2.17, p = .04$. Further, being engaged was significantly associated with greater normative accuracy, $b = .23, \beta = .56, z = 2.96, p = .003$, thus contributing to why self-presenters were viewed more positively. Of primary interest, as illustrated in Figure 2, being engaged was also significantly associated with greater distinctive accuracy, $b = .13, \beta = .53, z = 2.70, p = .008$, resulting in a significant indirect effect, $p = .038$ (test
It remains unclear from the current research whether self-presenters were seen with greater self–other agreement across all traits equally. Although distinctive self–other agreement can be interpreted both idiographically and nomothetically (e.g., Biesanz & Human, 2010; Kenny & Winquist, 2001), it still only informs us of the average level of accuracy across traits. Thus, it is quite plausible that this effect is stronger for some and weaker for other traits, perhaps those that are less immediately observable for instance (e.g., Funder & Dobroth, 1987; Human & Biesanz, in press). Directly examining this question, however, would require far more targets in order to attain adequate power. Nonetheless, the fact that this effect emerges on average across the 24 items assessed suggests that it is unlikely to be driven by just one or two primary traits. Thus, we can conclude that the general goal of positive self-presentation leads to greater self–other agreement regarding targets’ overall personalities as well as greater accuracy in detecting their intelligence.

Why were self-presenters viewed more accurately than those less motivated to self-present? Quite simply, self-presenting targets were more engaging than those who were self-presenting less, which in turn led to more accurate impressions. Presumably, perceivers pay more attention to more engaging individuals, detecting more cues and thus forming more accurate impressions. Why were self-presenters more engaging? The behavioral analyses described in the online supplementary appendix provide initial insight, demonstrating that more involved, positive, and confident behaviors are all associated with how engaging an individual was perceived to be. Further, behaving in a confident manner was also directly associated with being seen with greater distinctive accuracy.

These findings may extend more broadly to understanding why some people generally tend to be more accurately understood than others. For instance, perhaps, individuals who generally tend to be seen more accurately, such as those who are physically attractive (Lorenzo et al., 2010) and those who are well adjusted (Human & Biesanz, in press) and possess more positive personality traits, such as extraversion and agreeableness (Colvin, 1993), are also seen more accurately because they are more interpersonally engaging and confident. Indeed, if engagement is the larger mechanism at play, positive self-presentation may not be the only way to achieve accuracy—one might also more directly focus on being engaging, try to be more extraverted, or perhaps even try to make a negative impression on others and as a result keep their attention. Each of these routes, however, seem either equivalent (behaving like a well-adjusted, engaging, or extraverted individual is likely to result in very similar behaviors to self-presentation), more difficult (becoming more physically attractive to others is no easy task), or may carry negative consequences (one might be seen more accurately trying to make a bad impression, but they are also likely to be seen more negatively). Thus, although engagement may be the larger process at play here, positive self-presentation seems like a desirable and easy way to achieve it.

One alternative explanation is that self-presenters were viewed more accurately not because they were more engaging...
but because control targets were completely disengaged from the task, to the point where perceivers had insufficient information to form accurate impressions about them. This is plausible given that controls were explicitly told that we were “not concerned with their answers per se” in order to minimize self-presentation concerns. As such, self-presentation in our control condition may not mirror natural levels of self-presentation, which are likely to be higher in most situations involving impression formation. Nonetheless, there are several indications that controls were still at least moderately engaged in the task. Specifically, as noted above, controls provided an equivalent quantity of information to self-presenters—if controls were completely disengaged, they are unlikely to have spoken for as long, said as many words, and mentioned as many topics as the more engaged self-presenters. Further, although controls were rated as being significantly less engaging than self-presenters, their average rating on the engagement item was still above the midpoint of the 1 to 7 scale at 4.22. Thus, although indirect, these results point to the likelihood that controls were not completely disengaged, but that self-presenters were more engaged, and thus held perceivers’ attention better and allowed them to see their unique personality traits and intelligence levels more clearly.

An implication of these findings is that if perceivers are motivated enough to pay attention to targets, then control targets’ lower engagement might be overridden and accurate impressions could still be formed. Given the relative equality in information quantity and quality, it does seem likely that if perceivers could have stayed more attentive when viewing the control targets they could have formed more accurate impressions. Therefore, in an interview situation or first date, where perceivers are highly motivated, a lack of self-presentation may not always interfere with accuracy. Nonetheless, it seems likely that even in these highly motivated contexts, perceivers may not be able to fully control their attention, eventually (or even quite quickly) losing interest in their interaction partner and accordingly forming less accurate impressions relative to those who self-present and maintain their attention. Thus, while self-presentation may not be necessary to forming accurate impressions, the current study suggests it should certainly facilitate it by enhancing and maintaining perceivers’ attention.

Why were self-presenters viewed more positively than those not explicitly motivated to self-present? Once again, being engaging played a role, as did behaving in a more involved, confident, and to a lesser extent, positive, manner (see online supplementary appendix). Thus, consistent with previous research (e.g., Rosenfeld, 1966), when given the general instructions to make a good impression on others, individuals are able to adjust their behaviors in order to elicit the desired impression from others.

While it may be comforting for perceivers to know that self-presentation does not render impressions inaccurate and instead enhances accuracy, what are the implications for targets? Although the primary goal of self-presentation is to foster a positive impression in others, the enhanced accuracy may benefit the target as well, as people enjoy being seen in line with their self-views, even when negative (Swann et al., 1989). Combine these interpersonal benefits with the intrapersonal benefits of self-presentation, namely, the elevated mood that stems from engaging in positive self-presentation (Dunn et al., 2007), and it becomes clear that positive self-presentation is an adaptive interactional style.

There are several likely boundary conditions to this effect of self-presentation. First, we have only examined the general self-presentational goal of making a positive impression while maintaining authenticity in a relatively stress-free environment. Self-presentation in more stressful situations or without the constraints of honesty may not facilitate greater accuracy or self-other agreement, nor might more specific self-presentation goals, such as to be modest or be respected. Further, as noted throughout, accuracy was primarily defined here as distinctive self-other agreement; although this is an accepted index of realistic accuracy (Funder & Colvin, 1997) and our effect was paralleled with a more objective measure of intelligence, it remains to be seen whether the same pattern of results would hold for alternative accuracy validation measures, such as close informant reports. Nonetheless, positive self-presentation is clearly not the deceptive tendency it may at first appear to be. Instead, by capturing others’ attention, self-presentation facilitates more accurate first impressions.

Authors’ Note
Portions of the coding analyses were conducted as part of Kate L. Parisotto’s undergraduate honors thesis under the supervision of Jeremy C. Biesanz.

Declaration of Conflicting Interests
The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Funding
The author(s) disclosed receipt of the following financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article: This research was supported by Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada Grant SSHRC 410-2008-2643 to Jeremy C. Biesanz.

Note
1. This 24-item version of the BFI has been used in several other published papers (e.g., Biesanz et al., 2011; Chan et al., 2010; Human & Biesanz, 2011; Lorenzo et al., 2010). The specific items can be found in Human (2009) or obtained from the first or second author. Using a larger sample (N = 378) from the same population of UBC undergraduates, each Big Five subscale demonstrated adequate reliability (Extraversion, \( \alpha = .83 \); Neuroticism, \( \alpha = .73 \); Conscientiousness, \( \alpha = .66 \); Agreeableness, \( \alpha = .59 \); Openness/Intelligence, \( \alpha = .67 \)).

References


**Bios**

**Lauren J. Human** received her BA and MA from the University of British Columbia and is currently a PhD student in social and personality psychology at the University of British Columbia.

**Jeremy C. Biesanz** received his BA from Cornell University, PhD from Arizona State University, and is currently an assistant professor at the University of British Columbia. His professional website is http://www.socialaccuracy.com/.

**Kate L. Parisotto** received her BA (Hons.) from the University of British Columbia and is currently studying law at the University of British Columbia.

**Elizabeth W. Dunn** received her BA from Harvard University, PhD from the University of Virginia, and is currently an associate professor at the University of British Columbia. Her professional website is http://dunn.psych.ubc.ca/.